Appointing Joel Fitzgibbon as Minister for Defence was not one of Kevin Rudd's better management decisions. Examination of his performance over the past eight months shows the job is too big for Fitzgibbon.
On a recent visit to Washington, Fitzgibbon said he was in two minds about the war in Afghanistan. On some days, he confessed, the war seemed unwinnable; on other days he was more optimistic. Such a display of prevarication should send shivers up the spine of parents who have children in the Australian Defence Force.
The war is not winnable by military means. While Australia has troops on the ground in Afghanistan it should use that leverage to talk to the Taliban in Pakistan and their backers to ascertain what it is they want.
Australian intelligence efforts should be redirected towards trying to gauge whether the resistance to NATO and other western forces in Afghanistan is a religious crusade or whether it is a Pathan battle for power with both tribal and broader nationalistic overtones.
Australia should attempt to determine how much of the growing call to arms has been fuelled by the United States and NATO presence in Pathan tribal lands in Afghanistan. The lessons to be drawn from the Russian occupation of Afghanistan, and the British before them, should not be dismissed.
Fitzgibbon told the media in Washington that he was more than happy for the Americans to talk to the Pakistan Government about curtailing support for and curbing the activities of the Taliban. His assessment was craven and thoughtless. Australia is more than capable of developing complex diplomatic relationships and gathering intelligence under difficult circumstances.
This is not the Vietnam War. We have a diplomatic service and we should be using it. We need to talk to the government of Pakistan but more importantly we need to talk to the Taliban. It is in fighting them that we are risking the lives of young Australians.
Fitzgibbon's attention has wandered in other areas, too, notably in the aftermath of the crash of the Black Hawk helicopter on to the deck of HMAS Kanimbla in November 2006 an accident that killed the pilot and an SAS trooper.
Does Fitzgibbon, and before him Brendan Nelson, really believe that the helicopter was on a training exercise? Just because the media allows itself to get dazzled by the gold braid on the sleeve of the Chief of the Defence Force, Air-Vice Marshall, Angus Houston, does not mean that the politicians and the media should refrain from asking the tough, necessary questions of senior uniformed officers.
What sort of training exercise can be conducted over the ocean by 10 SAS soldiers other than ''dunk and lift''? And why do that training when their presence suggests that they were positioned for land operations as part of the uncertainty surrounding the coup in Fiji? If the training was being conducted for the benefit of the air crew, why put 10 SAS soldiers on board?
Fitzgibbon has to know that the Australian public is tired of the ADF's repeated attempts to withhold details of operational matters involving Australian servicemen. We read of a tragically delayed medivac of an Australian soldier by a US helicopter in Afghanistan, not from an ADF press release but by a leaked email from a Dutch military doctor. There has never been such secrecy surrounding an Australian military involvement as there has been in Afghanistan. Some of it is necessary, most is not.
At the announcement of the death of SAS Signaller, Sean McCarthy, in Afghanistan in July, Houston said that the soldier was evacuated immediately. That raises a worrying dilemma either Houston knew the truth and covered up or he was not advised by those on the ground in Afghanistan. The truth rests with one or other.
This degree of secrecy is unhealthy, and leads all too readily to opting for the cover-up when disclosure should be the way to go. Australia is, after all, a democracy. If the ADF wants to fill the many boots now vacant both they and their minister must take the Australian public much more into their confidence. If they are prepared to conduct military operations which might have adverse diplomatic consequences they should factor in the cost of disclosure.
Joel Fitzgibbon needs to show some leadership, and to come to grips with his department. Better still, before decisions are made in response to the soon-to-be released Defence White Paper, he should be replaced by Greg Combet.
Bruce Haigh is a political commentator, retired diplomat and former soldier.