The same might well be true of Brendan Nelson in NSW. NSW, like Victoria, badly needs a Liberal leader able to unite a divided party to the point where it is a credible alternative to a poorly performing Labor government. Both have public personas ideally suited to the ideology-free state sphere. They could, in short, run on general managerial competence and their records with much troubling people about examining their ideas, if any, or about what they stand for, if anything.

There's a long Australian tradition of federal politicians looking down their noses about aspiring to power at the state level. When someone suggested last year that Alexander Downer might take over the South Australian Liberals, he was positively insulted. Such a job could not attract a person who had been a Foreign Minister, he said.

Likewise, Julie Bishop has long rebuffed suggestions, some made even before the Federal Liberals lost government, that she might become leader of the Opposition in Western Australia. Mal Brough, at least initially, rejected out of hand the idea that his path back to power, after he lost his seat, might be via Queensland state politics.

Yet each of these politicians would be thought by most to be of significantly higher calibre than anyone presently in a Liberal leadership position in the states, and to have significantly greater experience in practical government. Long Labor reigns could well come to an end in most states during the next electoral cycle, but, in most states, internal Liberal dissensions, active sabotage by factions, and poor leadership stands in the way. Tired Labor premiers argue that their replacements would be worse. Even in cases where there is not an active smell about Liberal oppositions, leaders have struggled to develop policy, attractive programs, or to show how they could manage their states more effectively than Labor.

By contrast, Kevin Rudd could well lose the next federal election if he severely mismanages things, but it seems unlikely that strong and effective Opposition leadership can win it unless he stumbles. All things being equal, the voters are likely to give Labor at least another term, more likely two. By then, the party will be dispirited by consecutive losses, probably by unsuccessful flirtations with different leadership styles, policies and ideologies, and by progressive loss of experience of actually wielding power.

Sensible Liberal politicians know this, and know that Nelson is on a hiding to nothing. They are not surprised at his seeming inability to penetrate or gain traction with voters. Voters are hardly preoccupied, at this stage, with considering his qualities or his qualifications.

If they are alarmed, and they should be, it is by the fact that Nelson does not appear to have even started a process of fundamental reexamination of policies and preparation of the party for new tilts at government. Nor has he even begun to sketch to voters how the next Liberal government would approach major policy issues. He has been all over the shop to the visible fury of many on his front bench; and he has particularly failed to give voters any idea of what he stands for.

Most Liberals regard dropping Nelson as inevitable, even if some would prefer that the dumping be deferred until a new leader can catch the waves of any voter disillusion with the Rudd Government.

But there are real problems with thinking Costello an obviously better leader, even if he really wants to be. Costello is a more aggressive and pugnacious performer in parliament than Nelson is capable of being, and probably, has more strategic and tactical brains in his little finger. But voters have indicated over and over that they do not like him much, that they trust him very little. Tellingly, even after nearly 20 years near the top of his party, they have very little idea of what he stands for.

John Howard remarked recently that one of Rudd's political weaknesses was that voters could not recognise in him a sustaining ideal. (This is, of course, a replay of his oft-repeated statements about voters knowing what he stood for). Howard's gibe might well apply to Costello too.

When Costello, as Treasurer, was having one of his tizzes about Howard's refusal to stand aside for him, he indicated that he planned to speak out more on wider party issues, particularly on social policy. The hint, at the time, was that he planned to distinguish himself first as more socially liberal than Howard, particularly on Aboriginal affairs and human rights matters, and also as more economically conservative than Howard. Howard would be portrayed, like Malcolm Fraser, of lacking courage and of being a pragmatic rather than a conviction politician.

If this was the promise, or the threat, it never eventuated. If Costello's biography suggests it now, it is too late. There were few headland speeches and voters remained in the dark about where Costello stood on things. Likewise voters have little idea of where Costello stands on issues such as the environment, greenhouse, or most matters of foreign policy. They have seen him master the Government's brief, but even then, his debating skill has generally been rhetorical and theatrical. Substance has been absent.

This is quite apart from questions of his guts, the indecision he has always shown about a challenge, or about his failure to show any great economic virtue as Howard, in his last terms, was willing to junk principle and economic virtue in search of any available vote. Or about his squibbing the leadership when it was offered on a plate albeit in the bitter aftermath of defeat or his complete silence since. Or the vulnerability which Labor will exploit as an architect of a plan for workplace relations change far more radical than Howard put up.

His defenders might say that his book, when it comes, might answer some of the questions. Cynics suggest that he is encouraging all of the speculation merely so as to promote sales of the book. In political terms, of course, the more he presents himself as a hard man frustrated by Howard, or the more he defends his and the Howard government's record, the more he is vulnerable to attack by Labor.

If it's a Obama-like new vision thing, the response is to ask why he was so unsuccessful in promoting such things in office. And if he pretends some new virtue for example as a listener, or person (like Mark Latham) discerning popular cynicism with modern political process any number of people will remember aloud his arrogance and ruthlessness as Treasurer. .

For the Liberals, a retreat of some senior players to the states need not be an admission of present federal futility.

The states are where the action will be, and where the party needs to be rebuilt. It is, or could be, where real power can be exercised and where life can be made difficult for Rudd. The benefits of Liberal state incumbency could be, as it has been for Rudd Labor, the college and cache of policy and administrative talent.

And successful state premiers have always been federal players, and usually have had the opportunities if they have dared to go to Canberra as inside runners.

Most, of course, have not dared, or at least have been loath to surrender actual power for the promise of it.

But in a world where state and federal politics are more fluid, that could change, and a more professional party might think it should have its best players where they could make a difference.

Maybe it could be almost a matter of duty to the party.

Jack Waterford is Editor-at-Large.